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Abstract 
This paper describes a statistical model of equilibrium behavior in games, which we 
call Quanta! Response Equilibrium (QRE). The key feature of the equilibrium is that 
individuals do not always play best responses to the strategies of their opponents, but 
play better strategies with higher probability than worse strategies. We illustrate several 
different applicat
.ions of this approach, and establish a number of theoretical properties of 
this equilibrium concept. We also demonstrate an equivalence between this equilibrium 
notion and Bayesian games derived from games of complete information with perturbed 
payoffs. 
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1 Introduction
It is well known that the data from experimental games regularly show systematic de­
partures from the most basic predictions of standard game theory. This is true even in 
the simplest imaginable games, such as two person bimatrix zero sum games with unique 
mixed strategy equilibrium (O'Neill 1987, Brown and Rosenthal 1990, Ochs 1995) . When
games have multiple equilibrium, then conventional wisdom typically places further re­
strictions on the data, such as the restrictions implied by subgame perfection, and the 
news is even worse (Giith and Tietz 1990, Thaler 1988) . The evidence is overwhelming
that, at least as a predictive model of behavior, the standard theory of equilibrium in 
games needs an overhaul. The need of doing this is made even more urgent since we are 
already regularly apply traditional game theory as a predictive tool.1 
One possible response is to abandon Nash equilibrium entirely and explain these devi­
ations in terms of psychological theories of behavior. This is not what we are proposing 
here. While judgement biases, and other sources of deviations from rational behavior 
surely play some role ill. these departures, there is still a need to study models of the 
equilibrium interaction of these effects. Initial attempts at this (McKelvey and Palfrey
*We acknowledge support of National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-9223701 to the California
Institute of Technology and the support of the JPL-Caltech supercomputer project. A version of this 
paper was presented at the First Japanese Decentralization Conference at Keio University in November, 
1994. We are grateful to the warm hospitality during that conference, and appreciate the comments 
received from the audience. The second author thanks the Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle and 
CERAS for research support and hospitality. We acknowledge valuable discussions with Mahmoud El­
Gamal, Jacques-Franc;ois Thisse, and Mark Fey, and the research assistance of Euge:ne Grayver and Rob 
Weber. 
1There are countless examples of this. One obvious one is mechanism design, which has applications 
to in the design of incentives structures for firms and regulatory agencies, the design of auction and 
bargaining mechanisms, and public good provision. We also use game theory to make policy prescriptions 
for government intervention in imperfectly competitive industries, and in fact this has probably been the 
most significant trend in the field of industrial organization in the last couple of decades. More recently, 
game theoretic predictions have been applied to a variety of issues that arise in the study of international 
trade. In fact , if one goes back further, to the 1950's when the first surge of research in game theory 
began, the bulk of the research was largely motivated (and funded) by applications to arms races and 
other problems of international conflict and national security. 
(1992) , El-Gamal, McKelvey, and Palfrey (1993 , 1994)) have sought to explain system­
atic deviations from Nash equilibrium by presuming the existence of specific types of 
players who do not seek to maximize their expected payoffs in the experimental games. 
While this approach (and also the application of psychological theories of bias) have had
success in explaining some of the departures from Nash equilibrium, they are both open 
to the criticism of being post hoc, in the sense that the "invention" of types is specific 
to the game under consideration. What would be more desirable is a general model that 
does not need to be specially modified for each game and each dataset. 
This paper presents one such class of general models. We consider a very simple ex­
tension of the standard model of Nash equilibrium which can explain some of systematic 
violations of Nash equilibrium. The basic idea is that there are many different possible 
"types" of players, and that the statistical variation in behavior that is always observed 
in experiments is due to some underlying distribution of these types. As a result, behav­
ior will be stochastic, even if all agents have private information about their type and 
always adopt pure strategies . More importantly, because of the game setting, players 
will respond to anticipated errors of opponents in ways which can lead to systematic 
deviations from Nash equilibrium. 
We introduce this idea first in its "reduced form" which supposes that individual be­
havior is not perfectly optimal. Specifically, given a set of alternative choices, individuals 
choose probabilistically, choosing better alternatives more often than worse alternatives. 
The Nash equilibrium model thus corresponds to an extreme special case of this model, in 
which the probability of choosing an optimal alternative is equal to one. Thus our model 
specifies a choice probability function that depends on the vector of expected utilities of 
all available choices. 
In a game, the available choices to a player are given by his or her strategy set . The 
expected utility of each strategy for a player is determined by the probability distribution 
of the strategies of the other players of the game. Thus, the choice probability function in 
our model is a generalization of the "Best Response Correspondence" in game theory. We 
simply call it a Quanta! Response Function, and assume it is continuous and .positively 
responsive to the expected payoff of each strategy. A Quantal Response Equilibrium is a
fixed point of the quantal response functions, just as a Nash equilibrium is a fixed point 
of the best response correspondence. 
We then narrow our focus to a particular class of response functions associated with 
the logit model of choice. Each individual is assumed to have the same logit response 
parameter (which indexes how close it is to the standard best response model) . We term
the quantal response equilibria of this parametric model, Logit Equilibria. Given a 
particular game, we then define the logit equilibrium correspondence for that game as a 
function of the logit parameter. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995a) establishes a number of
technical properties of the logit equilibrium correspondence. We summarize them here 
and illustrate these properties with a series of examples. 
There are a number of models of subrational behavior in games that are related 
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to quantal response equilibrium. Rosenthal (1989) and Chen, Friedman, and Thisse 
(1995) explore models which also look at fixed points of statistical response functions. 
Van Damme (1987) presents a model in which it is costly for players to adopt pure 
strategies. This "control cost" model generates statistical response functions. Schmidt 
(1992) investigates games of reputation building in which players choose an optimal 
strategy with probability c and a suboptimal strategy with probability 1 - E, solves for
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game, when this is common knowledge 
among the players, and applies this to the analysis of experimental chain-store-paradox 
games. Zauner (1993) models behavior in the. centipede game by introducing Normally 
distributed payoff disturbances to the agent form of the game and then computes the 
resulting Bayesian equilibrium. This is essentially the same as looking at a quantal 
. response equilibrium with "Probit" response curves.2 Stahl and Wilson (1995) apply a
version of the logit equilibrium model to analyze data from a series of experimental two­
person games they conducted. Beja (1992) proposes a model of imperfectly rational play 
in games, where players are limited in their ability to exactly implement their strategy 
choices . Ma and Manove (1993) apply a similar idea to study bargaining games when 
the players '  cannot perfectly implement their bargaining strategies. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out the formal struc­
ture of the model for normal form games. In sections 2 and 3, we discuss the theoretical 
foundations of quantal response equilibrium, and show how it can be interpreted as a 
Bayesian equilibrium with Harsanyi-type payoff disturbances. Section 4 presents a para­
metric family of quantal response models, based on logit response curves. We call this 
the logit equilibrium. Section 5 shows how the logit equilibrium correspondence implies 
refinements of Nash equilibrium. We then apply this refinement to a simple bargaining 
game called "The Ultimatum Game." Section 6 discusses a number of extensions of the 
basic model: infinite strategy spaces, games of incomplete information, heterogeneity, en­
dogenizing the response curves, and games in extensive form. We make some concluding 
remarks in section 7. 
2 The Model
We begin by defining a game in its normal form in the standard way. Let I = {1, .. . , n}
be the set of players. For each i E I there is a strategy set Ai, which we assume
to be finite , with Ji elements. Each player has a payoff function ui : A -r R where 
A = ILEI Ai Let Si be the set of probability distributions over Ai and an element si E Si
is a mixed strategy. Given a strategy profiles E S = IliEJ Si player i's expected payoff
is Vi(s) = LaEA p(a)ui(a), where p(a) = rriEJ si(ai). A (mixed) strategy profile s E sis
a Nash Equilibrium if, for all i EI and for all ti E Si, vi(s) � vi(ti, s_i)· 
We next define a response function �' which, for a given player i, maps a vector of
2For an analysis of centipede games with logit response curves, see Fey, McKelvey, and Palfrey 
(forthcoming) and McKelvey and Palfrey (1995b). 
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payoffs for each possible pure strategy into a mixed strategy for i. That is, � : 'RJ; -+.Si· 
We denote the probability assigned to strategy aij by �j· A special case of a response 
function is the Best Response Function, which is multivalued and upper hemicontinuous, 
but not continuous. Here we wish to restrict attention to response functions that are 
single-valued and continuous. 
Let vi = ( vil, ... , Vij, ... , viJ;) be a vector of expected payoffs, one for each possible 
pure strategy in Si· We make the further two assumptions that:
1 .  � is increasing in each argument. That is, suppose that vi and v� differ only in the 
/h component. Then �i(vD;:::: �j(vi) if and only if v�i;:::: Vij·
2 . � assigns higher probabilities to better strategies. That is � preserves the order
of vi, so that �j(vi) ;:::: �k(vi) if and only if Vij;:::: Vik·
These assumption guarantee that the response functions are positively responsive. 
There are many different possible response functions that satisfy these restrictions. 
Given a set of response functions, R = Ri, . . . , R1, one for each player, and given a 
normal form game, (I, S, u), one can define an equilibrium relative to Ras a fixed point
of the following mapping from S to S. For any givens ES, �(vi(s)) maps si into a new
element of Si. Since u is continuous ins, Ris a continuous function mapping a compact
convex set into itself, and therefore has at least one fixed point. We call any such fixed 
point a R-response equilibrium of the game (I, S, u) . 
3 Foundations of R-Resp.onse Equilibria
The basic.idea that choice probabilities are related in a continuous and monotonic way to 
expected payoffs has been around a long time. It was first formalized in the mathematical 
psychology literature (Thurstone 1927, Luce 1959, Luce and Suppes 1965) where it was
applied to the study of data from individual choice experiments. The new dimension in 
applying the model to game theory is that the choice probabilities of one player affect 
the expected utilities of the other players' choice alternatives, so that the choice prob­
abilities themselves are endogenously determined. That is, random individual behavior 
has equilibrium effects. 
There are a number of ways to think about the adoption by players of responses that 
are not necessarily "best" responses. Two immediately come to mind. First one could 
interpret this as a departure from rationality by the players. In this sense, the model 
falls into the class of "bounded rationality" models. This is the interpretation given in 
Rosenthal (1989) and Chen, Friedman, and Thisse (1995) , and, as they point out, is the 
basic motivation behind the large literature in mathematical psychology called "proba­
bilistic choice." The idea here is that behavior is subject to choice errors (i .e., nonoptimal
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choice) by individuals, but these choice errors have a specific relationship to the true ex­
pected payoffs: "big" mistakes (i .e ., involving a large loss of utility relative to the optimal 
choice) are made less often than little mistakes. 
An alternative interpretation of smoothed best responses is consistent with standard 
game theory, following results by Harsanyi (1973) about Bayesian equilibria of games 
of incomplete information. The basic idea there is to think of the game (I, S, u) as a
complete-information approximation of a more complicated game of incomplete informa­
tion, in which the actual payoffs of the players are private information. These ·actual 
payoffs are equal to the payoffs given by (I, S, u), but .include additive disturbances
from a known distribution. The disturbances to player i 's payoffs are known only to i. · 
This generates a game of incomplete information with player types determined by the 
individual-specific payoff disturbances. 
This second interpretation is the basis for the model developed by McKelvey and 
Palfrey (1995a) , and is also related to the random-utility interpretation of randomness in 
discrete choice developed in the econometrics literature (see McFadden, 1976 .) The idea 
here is to interpret the random disturbances as latent variables which cannot be observed 
by an outsider (say an econometrician or another player in the game) . However, each
player is assumed to observe the sum of this latent variable and the true payoff. In this 
sense, one can think of the perturbed payoffs as simply being each player's estimate of 
the expected utility of a particular strategy, with the latent variable representing the 
estimation error. This is formalized below. 
For each i and each j E {1, . . . , Ji}, and for any s ES, denote by Vij(s) the expected 
utility to i of adopting the pure strategy aij when the other players use B-i· For each 
pure strategy aij, player i does not receive payoff Vij(s) but instead receives: 
Player i's profile of payoff disturbances, ci = (cii, ... , ciJ.), is distributed according to 
a joint distribution with density function fi(ci)· Assume that the marginal distribution 
of Ji exists for each cij and E(ci) = 0. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995a) call J = (!1, . . .  , Jn)
admissible if Ji satisfies the above properties for all i. The assumed choice behavior is 
that each player chooses strategy aii such that Vij 2 Vik Vk = 1, ... , Ji. Given this choice 
behavior, v and J induces a distribution over the actual choices by each player,. To be 
more specific, for any v, define Bij(v) as the set of realizations of ci such that strategy aij 
has the highest estimated (or disturbed) expected payoff. So 
Pij(v) = j J(c)dc
B;j(V) 
is the induced probability that player i will select strategy j given v. Since P( v) E S 
and v = v(s) is defined for any s E S,  Po v(s) = P(v(s)) defines a mapping from S 
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into itself. Any fixed point s* such that s* = P(v(s*)) is called a Quantal Response
Equilibrium of the game (I, A, u) . 
The following results are immediate, and the proofs are left to the reader: 
• For any admissible f, the mapping P o v a continuous response function
• For any admissible f ,  the mapping P o v has a fixed point
• Given f ,  a quantal response equilibrium i s  a R-Response Equilibrium, where R = P
4 Specific parametric models of R-Response Equilib-
. r1um 
Here we describe three different models of response equilibrium, which differ in their 
assumptions about the shape of the R function that maps the vector of expected payoffs 
to an agent into a vector of choice probabilities. The first was proposed by Rosenthal 
(1989) and is simply a linear response model which applies to games in which players 
have only two strategies . The second two are derived from the logit model of individual 
choice. 
4.1 Linear Response Model 
Rosenthal's (1989) T-equilibrium was developed as a model of boundedly rational be­
havior in games where players have only two strategies. That model specifies that the 
probability an individual adopts a particular strategy is a linearly increasing function of 
the difference between the expected payoff of that strategy and the expected payoff of 
the other strategy. If the t:wo strategies yield the same expected payoff (given the choice 
probabilities of the other players) then each is used with probability �· More generally,
. if Pi1 = min{maxO, .5 + B(vi1 - Vi2), 1} and Pi2 = 1 - Pi i, where Bis a nonnegative 
constant representing the degree of rationality of the players. As B approaches infinity, 
the linear response model approaches the Nash equilibrium. 
4.2 Smooth Response Models 
There are a number of possible examples of models using R functions that are smooth. 
One is the Luce model (Luce 1959), in which the odds of using one strategy as opposed 
to another strategy are proportional to the ratio of the expected utility of the strategies. 
This, and a generalization of it, where the odds are given by the ratio of expected 
utilities taken to some (nonnegative) power, µ, is examined by Chen, Friedman, and 
Thisse (1995). 
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An alternative model (see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995a, for a technical analysis of its
properties) is the logit model where the odds are determined by the exponential function
of the utilities times a given nonnegative constant, A. Specifically: 
This response function arises from the assumption that the distribution fi(ci) of 
payoff errors follows a type I extreme value distribution, with cumulative density function 
-.>.�·· . 
F(cij) = e-e •J, where the varepsilonij are independent. This distribution of errors is 
assumed in much of the discrete choice econometrics literature (see McFadden, 1973,
1976) . Here, the parameter A plays the same role as B in the linear model. As A 
approaches infinity, the model of behavior approaches the best response model. When 
A = 0 behavior is essentially random, as all strategies are played with equal probability. 
The quantal response equilibrium in this model is given by a vector of choice probabilities, 
one for each player, (s1, . . .  , si, . . . , s1) such that, for each i EI and for each aij E A1
where Xij = Vij(s). 
eAXij 
Si . = -....,---'£f �1 e>.x;k 
This produces a system of J = {'£{=1 Ji} equations, and it is easy to prove that this
system always has a solution for any value A E [O, oo) ((McKelvey and Palfrey 1995a) .
Any such point is called a logit equilibrium for A. The set of all (A, s) such that s solves
the above equation is called the Logistic Equilibrium Correspondence. Moreover, 
any limit .Point of a sequence of Logit Equilibria as A approaches infinity is a Nash
equilibrium of the undedying game. 
5 Properties of logit equilibria
Logit equilibria have a number of properties that are different than Nash equilibrium 
predictions. 
5.1 Use of dominated strategies 
A Nash equilibrium cannot use a strongly dominated strategy with positive probability. 
Various equilibrium refinements typically eliminate any Nash equilibria that use weakly 
dominated strategies. In contrast, a logit equilibrium uses every strategy with positive 
probability. The probability of adopting a strongly dominated strategy goes to zero 
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as >. goes to infinity. However weakly dominated strategies can be used with positive 
probability even in the limit, as is shown in examples later in this paper. 
5.2 Mixed strategy equilibria 
It is a property of mixed strategy Nash equilibria that the mixing probabilities do not 
depend on the players own payoffs over outcomes in the support of the equilibrium, but 
only on the other players' payoffs. Since a player is by definition indifferent between all 
strategies in the support of the mixed equilibrium, the only reason for mixing correctly is 
to keep the other players at the Nash equilibrium. In the logit equilibrium, in contrast, 
the mixing probabilities depend on the players' own payoffs. To see this, consider the 
game of Table 1, where x > 0. Let p represent the probability the row player chooses 
"U", and q represent the probability that the column player chooses "L" . This game has 
a unique Nash equilibrium at p = q = ! for all x.
L R 
U x,O 0,1 
D 0,1 1,0 
Table 1: A game with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. 
To see what the logit equilibrium looks like, set r = � ands = � · The equations
for a logit equilibrium can then be written as 
and 
l ( ) 
_ >..(sx -1) 
n r - , 
s+l 
l ( 
) _ >.(1-r) 
n s - .l+r 
When x = 1, r = s = 1 (i. e . ,  p = q = �) is a solution to the above equations for all
values of>... To see what happens when x > 1, solve for s in the first equation. yielding 
).+ln(r) 
s= ----
>..x-ln(r) 
(Note for O < ). < oo the denominator and the left hand side must be positive. So the 
numerator must also be positive). Now, substituting into the second equation, and then 
differentiating, we get that the derivative r' of r with respect to x is 
'( x+l 2(>..x-ln(r)))-l r + .
r(>.. + ln(r) (1 + r)2 
Since all terms in the fractions are positive whenever x 2: 0 and ).. > 0, it follows that r' 
(and hence p' = (l�'r)2) is positive. Thus, for the logit equilibrium, the mixing probability
is a function of the player's own payoff. For all values of 0 < ).. < oo, the probability of 
player 1 choosing "U" increases as x increases. 
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5.3 Payoff magnitude effects 
Since any game theoretic analysis starts from the assumption that utilities are expressed 
as Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, it is a property of game theory, and hence 
of any Nash equilibrium that predictions are unaffected by changes in the magnitude and 
scale of the utility function. Thus, any game theoretic analysis seems unable to ac.count 
for payoff magnitude effects. 
Since the logit equilibrium is a Bayesian equilibrium, the same conclusion applies here, 
as long as the same transformation is applied to the payoffs of the game and the payoff 
due to the error terms. However, if the payoff from the error arises from considerations 
outside of the game, then a change in magnitude of the game payoffs would affect the 
utilities in the game, but not the utilities contributing to the error term. In this situation, 
the prediction of the logit equilibrium would change. 
To see how the logit equilibrium predictions would change, note that in the logistic 
equation for Pij( vi), >. and Vij always enter as scalar multiples of each other. Thus, 
multiplying all utilities by a constant is equivalent to multiplying >. by a constant. Thus, 
if the precision parameter of the error term is >., and all of the game utilities (for all
players) are multiplied by a factor of a, then the resulting logit equilibrium would be
the same as a logit equilibrium for the original game under the assumption that the 
precision is a>.. It follows from results to be shown below, that in general this would 
imply that higher payoffs would lead to outcomes "closer" to Nash behavior. The case 
when the magnitudes for one player are changed, and the other player are not is not so 
clear cut. Here, multiplying one player's utilities by a constant while the other players 
were unchanged would be equivalent to introducing an individualized precision >.i for that 
player, where >.i = a>.. We discuss these effects again later in the context of heterogeneity 
of errors. 
6 Refinements· of Nash equilibrium implied .by the
logit equilibrium 
Following Harsanyi (1973), call a Nash equilibrium, a*, approachable if there exists a 
sequence of >.'s approaching infinity and a corresponding sequence of logit equilibria that 
converges to a*. It is easy to show that this set is non-empty, since the logit equilibrium 
correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. The set of approachable equilibria thus defines 
a refinement of .Nash equilibrium. A final property .of logit equilibria is that it defines 
(for almost all games) a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibrium. For small
enough vafoes of >., it can be shown that there is a unique logit equilibrium close to the 
"centroid" of the game. This is the point where all strategies are adopted with equal 
probability. We define the principal branch of the logit equilibrium correspondence to 
be the branch which starts at the centroid. For generic games, the principal branch is a 
one dimensional manifold, and hence can be followed for values of >. ranging from 0 to 
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infinity.3 The limit point of the principal branch as >. approaches infinity is called the 
logit solution of the game and is denoted u;,. Thus the logit equilibrium correspondence
can be used to define one weak refinement (approachability) and one strong refinement 
(the logit solution). 
We illustrate these ideas in a few simple examples below.4 
Example: The asymmetric game of chicken 
The first example is an asymmetric version of the game of chicken. If both players play 
"soft" then they each get an intermediate payoff. If they both play tough they. both get 
very low payoffs. If they choose different strategies, then the tough player receives a very 
large payoff, and the soft player receives a low payoff. The payoffs are given below, in 
Table 2 .  
tough soft 
tough 0,0 6,1 
soft 1,14 2,2 
Table 2: An asymmetric game of Chicken 
In this game there are three Nash equilibria, two corresponding to pure strategy 
equilibria where one player is tough and the other is soft ,  and the third corresponding 
to both players mixing. Usual refinements provide no help in selecting among equilibria. 
Figure 1 displays the logit equilibrium correspondence for this game. As one can see, the 
weak refinement of approachability by a sequence of logit equilibria does not provide any 
help , as all three equilibria are approached· by logit equilibria. The unique component of 
the equilibrium graph converges to the pure strategy equilibrium where the row player 
plays soft and the column player plays tough. This is the equilibrium favoring the player 
(column)' who benefits the most from playing tough. In fact this would seem to be a 
general property.5 of the class of asymmetric chicken games where the only asymmetry is 
in the payoff to the tough player when one player is tough and the other is soft. The logit 
solution always picks out the pure strategy equilibrium favoring the player benefitting 
the most from being tough .  
Example: J x J Ultimatum Games 
The second example is a very simple version of a bargaining game that has become known 
as "The Ultimatum Game" (see Giith and Tietz 1988 and Thaler 1988) . It has been 
3The basic idea and the mathematical tools needed to prove this are similar to the "tracing procedure" 
of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). But the selection that is made by the two solutions is different. 
4The interested reader should also see the papers by Chen, Friedman, and Thisse (1995) and McKelvey 
and Palfrey (1995a), which give a number of other examples. 
5We do not have a formal proof of this, but all the solutions we have computed have this property. 
A similar property appears to hold for asyml!letric Battle of the Sexes games. 
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Figure 1 :  QRE Correspondence for game of Chicken. Probability of "tough" for row 
player (top graph) and column player (bottom graph) 
the subject of a great deal of experimental work by both economists and psychologists, 
largely because the results strongly contradict the predictions of subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium.  In this game, there are two players, who are given the task of dividing a 
fixed sum of money according to the following simple rules. Player 1 offers a split of the 
money, and then Player 2 either accepts or rejects the proposed division. If the offer is 
rejected by Player 2, the game ends and neither player receives anything. Assume for the 
purposes .of analysis that there are a finite number of feasible splits6 (say, in one dollar 
increments). Then subgame perfect Nash equilibrium implies that Player 2 will receive, 
in equilibrium, either 0 or the lowest possible positive amount. 
A simplified version of the ultimatum game is easy to study in the context of the logit 
model. In this simplified version of the game7, the pie consists of 21 dollars and there are 
1 permissible splits of the pie, ranging from the 50/50 split (where each player receives
1 dollars) and the most favorable split for player 1 ,  subject to the constraint that player 
2 receives a positive amount. (I.e. , Player 1 receives 21 - 1 dollars and Player 2. receives 
1 dollar.) The second player writes down a minimum acceptable offer (some number 
between 1 and 1). If Player 1 offers at lea.st this .minimum level, then the outcome is
exactly the proposed split. If not, then both players receive 0. The normal form of this 
game is given below in Table 3. 
6 In all experiments, there are a finite number of choices available for Player 1 to offer Player 2 
7Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson (1993) investgate the evolutionary dynamics of the J=2 version of 
the game. 
1 1  
3 
2 
1 
3 
3,3 
0,0 
0 ,0 
2 
3,3 
4,2 
0 ,0 
1 
3,3 
4 ,2 
5 , 1  
Table 3: The 3 x 3 simplified ultimatum game. 
It is well known that this game has multiple Nash equilibria (in fact a continuum of 
Nash equilibria), only one of which is trembling hand perfect. In the perfect equilibrium, 
Player 1 offers (5, 1) and Player 2 chooses the third strategy (accept anything) . Figure 2 
shows the unique continuous selection from the logit equilibrium correspondence for val-
. ues of>. ranging from 0 to 10. This shows clearly that the logit solution to this game is 
not the unique perfect equilibrium, but rather results in the ( 4, 2) split. Player 2 does not 
adopt a pure strategy, but rather mixes evenly between the choices of "accept anything" 
and "reject only the worst offer." In addition to the limiting properties of this logit equi­
librium mapping, it is also instructive to look at the solution for low and intermediate 
values of >..  At low values of >. both players are nearly random, so the optimal strategy 
for Player 1 is actually the 50/50 split. Accordingly, for sufficiently small >. this is the 
modal offer. The probability of using the strategy of making the greediest offer declines 
very quickly in >.. For higher values of>., the modal offer becomes (4, 2) . For Player 2 ,  
the strategy of accepting only the equal split disappears very quickly. 
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Figure 2 :  Logistic QRE correspondence for the 3x3 ultimatum game 
Of course with only three strategies for each player it is difficult to tell whether or 
not the modal strategy in the logit solution will be close to the perfect equilibrium. To 
extend this example, consider the 6 x 6 version of the game, illustrated in Table 4 below. 
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6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
6 
6,6 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
5 
6,6 6,6 
7,5 7,5 
0,0 8,4 
0,0 0,0 
0,0 0,0 
0,0 0,0 
2 1 
6,6 6,6 6,6 
7,5 7,5 7,5 
8,4 8,4 8,4 
9,3 9,3 9,3 
0 ,0 10,2 10,2 
0,0 0,0 1 1 , 1  
Table 4 :  The 6 x 6 simplified ultimatum game. 
Figure 3 shows the unique connected component of the logit equilibrium graph. The · 
logit solution is now the (9, 3) split. As in the 3 x 3 version of the game, the modal offer 
begins with the equal split, and as ,\ increases, the modal offer progressively increases 
until it finally settles at the (9, 3) split. An interesting theoretical question would be 
what the logit solution for the equilibrium split converges to (as a fraction of 2J), as J 
goes to infinity. 
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Figure 3: Logistic QRE for the 6x6 ultimatum game 
7 Extensions
Many applications to economics involve games with infinite strategy spaces, private in­
formation, and sequential play. This includes, for example, voluntary contribution games 
in the provision of public goods, auctions, bargaining, principal agent models, oligopoly, 
spatial competition, and so .forth . Here. we explain how the logit model can be extended to 
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accommodate these different applications. Other parametric models of smooth response 
functions can be extended in a similar fashion 
7.1 Infinite Strategy Spaces 
If strategy spaces are infinite8, then the probability of adopting any particular pure 
strategy will be zero. However, it is possible to retain the basic idea that the odds of
one strategy vs. another strategy are given by the ratio of an exponential function ·of the
expected utility of each strategy. That is, we still want it to be the case that, for_any 
a, a' E Ai, the ratio, is given by:
. Thus, p(a) is given by: 
e>.va 
p(a)/p(a') = e>-va'
e>-va 
p(a) = 
IA; e>-vtdt
as long as IA; e>-vtdt is well-defined. In general, if Ai is infinite, then it may or may not 
be possible to define a probability distribution function (density function) p(a) satisfying 
this logit condition for all a, a' E Ai. It depends on whether or not the integral of e>-va
with respect to the Lebeague measure is guaranteed to be finite. We restrict p(a) to be 
a measurable function . Further assumptions are needed on the game to ensure that the 
logit response function is well-behaved. 
For . example, if Ai is a compact subset of nn and the underlying payoff function 
of the game is continuous, then IA; e>-v1dt is well-defined. There are some additional 
technical issues that must also be addressed, as discussed in some of the literature on the 
econometrics of probabilistic choice models. 
7 .2 Games of Incomplete Information 
If players have private information, represented by Type Sets, (T1, • • •  , T1 ) , and type 
contingent beliefs,  7ri(ti) which specify Player i 's beliefs about the types of the other 
players. Then the.extension of:strategies,.is a Type-Gentingent {Mixed) Strategy,
which , for each player, maps Ti into Si. Such a strategy will be denoted CTi and, for each
t E Ti and for each aij E Ai, aij(t) denotes the probability player i plays strategy aij under
ai. Payoffs may depend on the entire profile of types, as well as the profile of actions. The 
8Some natural applications include oligopoly and spatial competition. Some of these are studied in 
the context of a generalized version of Luce's random choice model in Friedman, Thisse, and Palfrey 
(1995). 
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extension of Nash equilibrium to this kind of game is called a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, 
and a similar extension is possible for the logit equilibrium (or, more generally, quantal
response equilibrium). Given a strategy profile a, this implies an effective mixed strategy 
Si for each player, which is a probability distribution over Ai, where the probability of
strategy aij just given by 
Sij = { <7ij(t)dF(t).}T; 
If the type space is finite, then the definition is the same, except the integral is replaced 
by a finite sum over the types in Ti . Given an effective mixed strategy profile, s, the 
probability each type of each player assigns to each strategy is given by the logit equation
below:
e>.v;; ( s) 
a ij (Vi ( s)) = -E-f""'"�-1 -e->.v-,k-(-s) 
Where vi( s) is defined as before. Then, given the parameter, >.,·a logit equilibrium is 
any a satisfying the above system of simultaneous logit equations where s is the effective 
mixed strategy under a. It is straightforward to show in the case of finite T that a 
logit equilibrium exists for any game and for any nonnegative value of >., and that the 
logit equilibrium correspondence has the same properties as in the model for games with 
complete information. If T is a compact rectangle in Rn then we also have existence, 
under appropriate regularity conditions on the joint distribution of types. We illustrate 
this equilibrium for the following public goods game, which has been studied extensively 
in experiments by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1992, 1993, 1994).9 
Example: Voluntary provision of a binary public good. 
There are I players, each of whom is endowed with a single indivisible unit of private 
good. Each player independently decides whether to "contribute" their unit of private 
good toward the production of the public good. If at least K �I units are contributed, 
then the public good is provided. (Unused contributions are not rebated .)  Each player 
values the public good the same (which we normalize at 1). Each player's valuation of 
their discrete unit of the private good is private information, and this value is . denoted
by ci, which we call i's contribution cost. These valuations are independently drawn 
from a commonly known probability distribution denoted F(c). The payoff function to 
player i is thus given as follows: 
Ui = 1 + c if i does not contribute and at least K others contribute 
9See also the theoretical analysis in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
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ui = 1 if i contributes and at least K - 1 others contribute 
ui = c if i does not contribute and fewer than K others contribute 
ui = 0 if i contributes and fewer than K - 1 others contribute 
For this example, assume that the distribution of costs is uniform over the interval 
[0, 1 .5], N = 3 and K = 2 .  A symmetric Bayesian equilibrium is represented by a 
cutpoint strategy, c*, according to which each individual contributes if and only if their 
contribution cost is less than or equal to c* .  It is easy to see that such a cutpoint must 
equal the probability that an individual's contribution is critical to the production of the 
public good, given that the other players are adopting the same cutpoint decision rule.10
For this example, the pivotal condition reduces to: 
c* = 2c*(l - c*)/2.25 
There are two Bayesian equilibria of this game, one in which no one ever contributes, 
i.e . ,  c* = 0 (which can be shown to be unstable) and another in which c* = .375 , which
produces an effective mixed strategy of each player contributing with probability .25 .  
The logit equilibrium is  not a cutpoint equilibrium since, for every contribution cost, 
and for every value of A, the probability of contribution must lie strictly between 0 and
1 .  Fixing A, this defines a function assigning a probability of contribution to each value
of c. Call this function P(  c). Then define: 
Q = 1 P(t)J(t)dt
and 
e,\(2Q(I-Q)-c)P(c)= 1 + e..\(2Q(I-Q)-c) 
While we do not have an analytical solution, it is fairly easy to obtain numerical 
solutions, for any value of A. The numerical solutions for Q, as a function .of A, are
graphed in the darker curve displayed in Figure 4 below. 
Notice that the probability of contribution is greater than the Bayesian equilibrium 
( . 25) for all values of A. This is interesting because it is consistent with similar exper­
imental findings (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1991 ,  1992, 1993) where contribution levels in 
10In some cases, but not in this example, an equilibrium of always contributing regardless of one's 
contribution cost may exist, in which case, the probability of being pivotal must be greater than or equal 
to the upper bound on the distribution of costs. This could happen for example if N = K and the
maximum value of c were less than 1. 
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Figure 4: Q as a function of >. for voluntary contribution games 
this game were systematically greater than the Bayesian equilibrium contribution levels. 
They reported that extent of overcontribution varied considerably depending on the ex­
act values of K, N, and the distribution of costs. For example, less overcontribution is 
observed in a similar game in which K is reduced from 2 to 1 .  The logit equilibrium 
graph of this variation is shown as the lighter curve in Figure 4. Notice that it converges 
much more rapidly as a function of >. for this variation of the game, suggesting a possible 
theoretical explanation for this apparent anomaly. 
7.3 Heterogeneity 
The models described above, including the extensions, assume that all players have the 
same parameter, >..11 However, there are good reasons to believe that many situations 
correspond to environments in which different players' response functions are different. 
The simplest way to model this is to assume that different players have different values 
of >.. As an example, consider a chess game between an expert and a beginner. If 
this were common knowledge, then the expert might adopt a different strategy than she 
would against .4:1.nother expert . The same might be true -of two bargainers, one who is 
very experienced at negotiation and the other who is not. Such an example might be 
the haggling that often occurs at flea markets between the sellers (who are typically 
very experienced at haggling) and the buyers (many of whom frequent flea markets only 
occasionally) .  As a third example, if one were to apply this model to entry deterrence by 
11 Implicitly it is also assumed that this is common knowledge, at least in the Harsanyi interpretation 
of the logit equilibrium as a Bayesian equilibrium of a game of incomplete information. 
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a monopolist, one might wish to assume that the entrant has a lower value of>. than the 
incumbent. Finally, some experiments have been conducted using subjects of different 
levels of experience, and it would be reasonable to assume that the more experienced 
players have higher >.'s. 
Example: Illustration of heterogeneity 
Consider the game of Table 1 ,  setting x = 4 . .  This is similar to an experimentai game 
reported in Ochs (1995). 
In Figure 5 ,  we graph the logit equilibria of this game, first under the assumption of 
homogeneous >. (>.1 = >.2 = >.) and second under the assumption that the>. for Player 2
is one fourth the value of the >. for Player 1 (>.1 = 4>.2 = >. ).12
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Figure 5: The effects of heterogeneity 
We see from the figure that the decreased accuracy of player 2 results in that player 
staying closer to random behavior and further from the Nash equilibrium for all ·values of 
>.. This also results in an adjustment to player 1 's strategy. Since player 1 expects player 
2 to be less -accurate, he -can now take advantage of the fact that player 2 is playing L 
too frquently, and adopt U with higher probability than the Nash prediction of �· 
In principle, one could extend the model of heterogeneity even further, by dropping 
the assumption that the profile of >.'s is common knowledge among the players. One 
12Notice that this is equivalent to the logit equilibria in which all payoff of Player 2 are multiplied by 
a factor of t. 
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alternative would be to assume that each player's A is drawn from a commonly known
distribution. 
7 .4 Endogenizing A 
The question of heterogeneity leads a step further to the more general issue of what 
determines the level of A. There are at least two possibilities which are both worth
further consideration, but are beyond the scope of this paper. The first is that,· if one 
interprets A as a measure of how carefully a player is making the decision, then it may
make sense to treat A as a choice variable, rather than taking it to be exogenous. Smith
and Walker [1993] use a model like this to explain departures from individual decision 
making, in which there is a tradeoff between costly effort of making an optimal choice 
and the expected utility gain from being careful. This model, or something like it, could 
be extended by imposing the logit equilibrium conditions. A second way to endogenize 
A is to construct specific learning models, which could explicitly model the changes in
A resulting from experience. As history of past play accumulates, then players should
be better able to estimate the expected payoffs, at least for those strategies that have 
been used in the past . This would produce stochastic versions of models that have been 
looked at in the past, such as fictitious play, cournot dynamics, and linear adjustment 
processes. 
7.5 Games in extensive form 
A number of interesting new issues arise in the application of the logit equilibrium to
extensive form games. The technical de.tails, as well as a variety of applications to
experimental games, are discussed in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995b) . 
We begin by defining a game in its extensive form in the standard way. Let I = 
{O, 1, . .. , I} be the set of players, with (player "O") called nature. The game is repre­
sented by: 
• a set of nodes, with elements x E X
• an initial node, denoted x0
• a set of terminal nodes Z � X
• an immediate precedence relation P defined on X x X representing branches. If
xPx' then x immediately precedes x' and x' immediately follows x. P is
asymmetric and acyclic.
• a partition of the non-terminal nodes, X - Z, into I +  1 subesets, x0,X1, . • •  ,X1,
with X0 called Nature's moves and Xi called the moves of player i. 
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• for each x E X0 , a probability distribution over its immediate followers.
• for each i a partition of Xi into k(i) information sets, hil , hi2 , • • •  , hik(i) · The set of 
player i 's information sets by Hi . 
• a set of available actions, Aii , associated with each information set, and the union
of all these actions over all information sets is denoted Ai.
• a payoff function for each player, ui that assigns a real number to each element of
z.
For each terminal node z E Z there is a unique path connecting the initial node, which
consists of a sequence of moves by one or more players. We will assume throughout that 
the game has perfect recall . That is, every player knows his past actions and knows 
everything he knew at any of his previous information sets. 
A behavior strategy for player i E I is a function bi : Hi -+ M (Ai) satisfying
bi (hij) E M (Aii) for all i and for all hij E Hi , where M (C) indicates the set of all
probability mea.Sures over the set C. For hij E Hi we use the shorthand bij = bi (hij ) ·
For each a E Aij , bij (a) denotes the probability of action a. Let Bi denote the set of
all behavior strategies for player i, and B = TiieN Bi be the set of behavior strategy n­
tuples. A pure strategy for i is a behavior strategy that assigns a degenerate probability 
distribution to each hij E Hi.
The idea of a logit equilibrium in an extensive form game is the same as in the 
normal form model, except that the logit response probabilities are defined on the con­
ditional expected payoffs at a decision node, and a version of sequential rationality is 
automatically13 imposed. Given a behavior strategy, b, and any information set hij , and 
any action aijk E Aij we can define the conditional distribution over the terminal nodes
for that ·action. From .tJiis conditional distribution over terminal nodes, we can compute 
the expected payoff for each aijk E Aij , conditional on reaching Aij . Denote this by
v( aijk i b). Then the logit model simply requires that the probability of choosing aijk at 
information set hij is given- by 
A Logit Equilibrium in the extensive form, is any b satisfying this equation for all 
i ,  j, a' E Aii ·  We .also refer to this as the Agent liogit Equilibrium, because it can be
justified as a Bayesian equilibrium of the agent model14 of the extensive form game, in 
13It is automatically imposed, in the sense that the logit model implies all decision nodes can be 
reached, and players are responding to their conditional payoffs. 
14In the agent version of an extensive form game, each information set of a player is interpreted as 
a different agent of that player, but all agents of the same player share identical preferences over the 
terminal nodes. 
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2· 1 
2 2,2 2,2 
1 0,0 3,1 
Table 5 .  
Normal form of simple ultimatum game . 
. which the payoff perturbations are with respect to each of the conditional payoffs of each 
agent at each information set. Thus it is as if the different agents of a player observe 
different information, which none of the other players, including the other agents of the 
same player, observe. The Bayesian equilibria of such a game, when the perturbations 
are distributed according to a double exponential distribution with parameter ,\, are 
equivalent (in terms of path probabilities) to the logit equilibria.
Example: The invariance principle 
An interesting feature of the logit equilibrium in extensive forms is that it depends on 
"inessential" transformations15 of the extensive form. Thus it predicts different patterns 
of behavior for strategically equivalent games. A nice example of this is the simple 
ultimatum game, with J = 2. Consider the game being played in two stages. In the 
first stage, the first mover makes an offer of either (2, 2) , or (3, 1 ) . If the equal split is
offered , the second mover must accept it . Otherwise, the second mover can either accept 
or reject. The normal form of this game is given in Table 5 and the extensive form is 
given in Figure 6. The logit equilibrium correspondence of the normal form 16 of this 
game is shown in Figure 7a, and Figure 7b below shows the unique extensive form logit 
equilibrium. 
Two comparisons are noteworthy. First, the equilibrium correspondence is unique 
for the sequentially played version of the game and is not unique for the simultaneous 
version. Second, for all values of ,\, the logit equilibrium (both of them, in fact) in
the simultaneous version of the game has a higher probability of a fair offer than the 
sequential version of the game. This occurs because for all values of ,\ the conditional 
probability Player 2 will reject an unfair offer is higher in the simultaneous version. The 
intuition for this is simple. In the simultaneous move version, the .conditional expected 
utility difference between Player 3 's two strategies is less than in the sequential version, 
15 An inessential transformation of a game in extensive form produces another game which has the 
same reduced normal form. 
16This is also the extensive form logit equilibrium correspondence for the extensive form game in which 
Player 2 must choose whether or not to reject an unfair offer, before observing the offer. For this reason,
we refer to this version of the game as the simultaneous play version, and the other as the sequential 
play version
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Figure 6: Extensive form of simple ultimatum game: 
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since Player 2 does not know Player 1 's offer at the time he chooses his strategy. Thus 
the probability of the worse of the two strategies (rejecting unfair offers) is higher in the 
simultaneous version. 
This latter observation is discussed in greater detail in McKelvey and Palfrey ( 1995b) . 
That paper also analyzes some experiments by Schotter, Weigelt, and Wilson ( 1994) that 
provide empirical support for these effects of inessential transformations of the game. 
8 Concluding remarks
This paper presented a statistical framework for modelling equilibria in noncooperative 
games. The framework blends the ideas from Nash equilibrium and Harsanyi's  notion of 
Bayesian equilibrium with standard statistical models of discrete choice. Besides provid­
ing new insights into behavior in games, this model provides a potentially useful tool for 
the econometrics of game theory. 
The framework can be easily applied to data analysis as a tool for estimation and 
testing. This is discussed in detail in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995a, 1995b) , which 
illustrates this with a number of specific applications using experimental data sets. This 
econometric approach is in the same category of applications to data from experimental 
games as El-Gamal et al. ( 1993) ,  El-Gamal and Palfrey (1994a, 1994b) and McKelvey 
and Palfrey (t992), although those papers did not model the statistical component of 
behavior as varying monotonically in the expected payoffs. 
A number of theoretical insights can be drawn from this model. First, it provides a 
unique equilibrium selection in generic games. Second, it predicts systematic differences 
in equilibrium behavior compared with the predictions of Nash equilibrium or some al­
ternative refinements of Nash equilibrium. This was illustrated with discrete versions 
22 
1.00 p 
0.03 
0.87 Player 1 o.eo 
0.73 
0.67 
0.60 
0.53 
0.47 
o.co 
0.33 
0.27 
0.20 
0.13 
0.07 
0.00 
O.o1 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.25 0.55 1 .22 2.72 6.05 13.47 30.00 
Q 
1 .00 
0.93 
0.87 Player 2 0.80 
0.73 
0.67 
0.60 
0.53 
0.47 <: _  o.co 
0.33 
0.27 
Q.20 
0.13 
0.07 
0.00 
0.01 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.25 0.55 1.22 2.72 6.05 13.47 30.00 
Figure 7a 
1.00 p 
0.93 
0.87 
0.80 Player 1 
0.73 
0.67 
0.60 
0.53 
0.47 
0.40 
0.33 
0.27 
0.20 
0.13 
0.07 
0.00 
0.01 0.02 0.05 0.11  o.25 0.55 1.22 2.12 6.05 13.47 30.00 
1 .00 
0.93 
0.67 
0.60 
0.73 
0.67 
Q.60 Player 2 
0.53 
0.47 
0 40 
0.33 
0.27 
0.20 
0.13 
0.o7 
--0.00 
O.ot 0.02 0.05 0. 1 1 0.25 0.55 1.22 2.12 6.05 13.47 30.00 
Figure 7b 
Figure 7: Logistic QREs for strategic and sequential version of the simple ultimatum 
game 
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of the ultimatum game, but applies in oth·er contexts as well. For example, McKelvey 
and Palfrey (1995b) successfully apply this theory to explain why unintuitive sequential
equilibria are played in certain experimental signaling games (Banks et al. 1994, Brandts
and Holt 1992, 1993) . These systematic differences from Nash equilibrium also imply
systematic deviations from the "invariance principle" that behavior should be the same 
in two different extensive form games as long as they have the same reduced normal form 
(Kohlberg, E. and J.-F. Metens, 1986) .
Finally, there are several directions to extend this framework, some of which were dis­
cussed briefly above. These include allowing for heterogeneity, continuous action spaces, 
learning, and private information. 
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